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Abstract
Recently G. Jakimoski and L. Kocarev cryptanalzed two chaotic cryptosystems
without using chaotic synchronization – Baptista cryptosystem and Alvarez cryp-
tosystem. As a result, they pointed out that neither of the two cryptosystems are
secure to known-plaintext attacks. In this letter, we re-study the performance of
Jakimoski-Kocarev attack on Baptista cryptosystem and find that it is not efficient
enough as a practical attack tool. Furthermore, a simple but effective remedy is
presented to resist Jakimoski-Kocarev attack, and the detailed discussion on its
performance are given.
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1 Introduction
The tight relationship between chaos and cryptography makes it natural to
employ chaotic systems to design new crytposystems [1–3]. From 1989 on,
many different chaotic encryption systems have been proposed, including se-
cure communications based on chaotic synchronization of analog circuits [3]
and chaotic cryptosystems without using chaotic synchronization (most are
designed for implementation on digital circuits or computers) [2, 4–18]. Since
cryptanalytic works [19,20] have shown that most chaotic secure communica-
tions based on chaotic synchronization are not secure enough, the alternative
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idea of designing chaotic encryption systems without chaotic synchronization
has attracted more and more attention recently. Among the chaotic cryp-
tosystems without chaotic synchronization, some [8–11] have been known to
be insecure from strong cryptographic viewpoint [21–24], and others are still
waiting for further cryptanalytic works to measure their security exactly.
In the past few years, two recently-proposed chaotic cryptosystems without
using chaotic synchronization have attracted much attention - Baptista cryp-
tosystem [12] and Alvarez cryptosystem [11]. In [13], W.-K. Wong et al. en-
hanced Baptista cryptosystem with some modifications. In [23], Alvarez cryp-
tosystem is successfully cryptanalyzed by four different attacks. In [14], two
essential defects of Alvarez cryptosystem have been distinguished and an im-
proved version of Alvarez cryptosystem is proposed to resist the four known
attacks in [23]. In [25], G. Jakimoski and L. Kocarev analyzed both of the
above two chaotic cryptosystems and pointed out that neither of them are
secure to known-plaintext attacks.
This letter studies the performance and countermeasure of one Jakimoski-
Kocarev attack presented in [25], which is originally claimed to attack Baptista
cryptosystem in [12], but can also be easily extended to break the modified
Baptista cryptosystem in [13] and the improved Alvarez cryptosystem in [14].
Our study leads to a different result from the one given in [25]: Jakimoski-
Kocarev attack is not efficient enough to break related chaotic cryptosystems,
and a simple remedy can be used to effectively resist this attack.
2 Related chaotic cryptosystems
Firstly, let us give a brief introduction of original Baptista cryptosystem [12].
Here a rather different way from the one in [12] is used to make the description
clearer. Given a one-dimensional chaotic map F : X → X, divide an interval
[xmin, xmax) ⊆ X into S -intervals X1 ∼ XS: Xi = [xmin+(i−1)ε, xmin+ iε),
where ε = (xmax−xmin)/S. Assume plain messages are composed by n different
characters α1, α2, · · · , αS, use a bijective map
fS :X = {X1, X2, · · · , XS} → A = {α1, α2, · · · , αS} (1)
to associate the different -intervals with different characters. Define a new
function f ′S : X → A: f ′S(x) = fS(Xi), if x ∈ Xi.
Given a plain-message M = {m1,m2, · · · ,mi, · · ·} (mi ∈ A), Baptista cryp-
tosystem can be described as follows.
The chaotic system: Logistic map F = bx(1− x).
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The secret key : the association map S 1 , the initial condition x0 and the control
parameter b of the logistic system.
Encryption procedure: i) The first plain-character m1 – Iterate the chaotic
system from x0 to find a chaotic state x that satisfies f
′
S(x) = m1, and record
the iteration number C1 as the first cipher-message unit and x
(1)
0 = F
C1(x0); ii)
The ith plain-message character mi – Iterate the chaotic system from x
(i−1)
0 =
FC1+C2+···+Ci−1(x0) to find a chaotic state x satisfying f ′S(x) = mi, record the
iteration number Ci as the i
th cipher-message unit and x
(i)
0 = F
Ci(x
(i−1)
0 ).
Decryption: For each ciphertext unit Ci, iterate the chaotic system for Ci
times from the last chaotic state x
(i)
0 = F
C1+C2+···+Ci−1(x0), and then use
x
(i)
0 = F
Ci(x
(i−1)
0 ) to derive the plain-character mi by the association map fs.
Constraints of Ci: Each cipher-message unit Ci should yield to the constraint
N0 ≤ C1 ≤ Nmax (N0 = 250 and Nmax = 65532 in [12]). Since there exist many
options for each Ci in [N0, Nmax], an extra coefficient η is used to choose a right
number: if η = 0, Ci is chosen as the minimal number satisfying f
′
S(x) = mi;
if η 6= 0, Ci is chosen as the minimal number satisfying f ′S(x) = mi and κ ≥ η
simultaneously, where κ is a pseudo-random number with normal distribution
within the interval [0, 1].
The above cryptosystem has two defects: a) the distribution of the plaintext
is not balanced, and the occurrence probability decays exponentially as Ci
increases from N0 to Nmax; b) at least N0 chaotic iterations are needed to
encrypt a plain-character, which makes the encryption speed very slow com-
pared with other conventional ciphers. In [13], the above original cryptosystem
is improved by the following modification: for each plain-character mi, firstly
generate a pseudo-random number r distributed uniformly between 0 and a
pre-defined maximum rmax, iterate the chaotic system for r times and then
iterate it until find a chaotic state x satisfying f ′S(x) = mi, record the iter-
ation number as the cipher-message unit Ci. Such a modified cryptosystem
can avoid the first defect of the original one, but cannot overcome the second
defect efficiently (only a better trade-off between the two defects is provided).
The improved Alvarez cryptosystem proposed in [14] is rather different from
the original Baptista cryptosystem (an entirely different method is used to
associate the different plain-characters and different chaotic states), but it
also uses the number of chaotic iterations in the ciphertext to find a position
corresponding to the current plaintext unit. This feature makes it possible to
extend Jakimoski-Kocarev attack to attack this cryptosystem. Here, we omit
technical details, and the readers are suggested referring to [11,14,23].
1 We think that the map fS should not be included in the secret key from imple-
mentation consideration and Kerckhoffs’ principle [26].
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Table 1
An association table constructed from two known plaintexts “subject” and “to”
n 254 272 521 530 835 1120 1434 1710 2132
mi t s o u b j e c t
In the following contexts, to simplify description, we will chiefly focus our
attention on the original Baptista cryptosystem in [12]. Please note that the
analysis can be easily extended to the chaotic cryptosystems presented in
[13,14].
3 Jakimoski-Kocarev attack and its performance
3.1 Jakimoski-Kocarev attack
In [25], G. Jakimoski and L. Kocarev proposed a known-plaintext attack to
break the original Baptista cryptosystem. The cryptanalysis is based on the
following fact: one can establish an association table between the moment
of interest and the plain-characters by observing plaintext/ciphertext pairs,
where “the moment of interest” of the ciphertext unit Ci is n =
∑i
j=1Cj
(the total number of chaotic iterations from x0). The table can be used to
decrypt the corresponding plain-characters if the same moment n re-occurs
in the ciphertext. In [25], an example is given to explain this attack: assume
“subject” and “to” are two known plaintexts and they are encrypted as 272
258 305 285 314 276 422 and 254 267 respectively. Then one can obtain
an association table shown in Table 1. Using the constructed table, he can
decrypt any ciphertext that corresponds to a recorded moment. For example,
a ciphertext 272 249 can be immediately decrypted as “so” (272 denotes “s”
and 272 + 249 = 512 denotes “o”). Apparently, if more plaintext/ciphertext
pairs are known, this table will contain more associations, and then more
ciphertexts can be decrypted by this table. Conceptually, such an attack is also
available to break the modified Baptista cryptosystem [13] and the improved
Alvarez cryptosystem [14].
3.2 Performance of Jakimoski-Kocarev attack
In [25], the authors stated that “Statistical tests show that over 90% of the mo-
ments of interest can be recovered using only 4000 plaintext/ciphertext pairs”.
It seems that this attack is rather perfect as a tool to break related chaotic
cryptosystems. However, we will point out that its performance is not so ef-
fective as G. Jakimoski and L. Kocarev claimed. Let us consider the following
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facts about this attack.
Fact 1: to decrypt one ciphertext unit, averagely more than one plain-characters
should be known. If an attacker gets to know a plaintext with i different charac-
ters, he can construct a table with i different associations, and then he can use
the i associations to decrypt i ciphertext units. That is to say, to decrypt one
ciphertext unit, one plain-character must be known firstly. When the number
of known plain-characters Np increases, the number of decrypted ciphertext
units (i.e., the moments of interest) Nc will also increase. However, the incre-
ment ratio of Nc will be less than the ratio of Np, since plain-characters in
different plaintexts may generate the same associations in the table. As the
number of plaintexts increases, the ratio of Nc will become even less and less.
See Fig. 1 for an experimental curve about the increment of Nc with respect
to Np. Consequently, to decrypt one ciphertext unit, averagely more than one
plain-characters are required. Apparently, Jakimoski-Kocarev attack is more
of an exhaustive attack than an intelligent and effective one.
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
0
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1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
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N c
Fig. 1. The increment of Nc with respect to Np
(Related parameters are S = 256, b = 3.78, x0 = 0.43203125, xmin = 0.2,
xmax = 0.8. 1024 plaintexts with 10 random plain-characters are used.)
Fact 2: if all known plaintexts contain at most i plain-characters, it is almost
impossible to decrypt any plain-character whose position is far beyond i and
absolutely impossible to decrypt any plain-character whose comment of inter-
est is beyond i ·Nmax. For a given plaintext, if the first i plain-characters (and
the corresponding ciphertext units) are known, it is absolutely impossible to
decrypt any following plain-character in this plaintext. What’s more, even if
the first i plain-characters of a lot of plaintexts are known, it is probabilisti-
cally impossible to decrypt any plain-character whose position is far beyond
i. In fact, because of the exponentially decayed occurrence probability of Ci
(please see Fig. 3 of [12] and Fig. 1 of [13]), the probability of successful attack
will decrease exponentially as the plain-character goes away from i and de-
crease to zero once the comment of interest becomes larger than i ·Nmax. For
example, given a plaintext “Can you give me any help to break this chaotic
cryptosystem” encrypted by the original Baptista cryptosystem, assume an at-
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tacker can only get to know plaintexts with 3 plain-characters, it will be almost
(probabilistically) impossible for him to decrypt the last word “cryptosystem”
although he can decrypt the first word “Can” with rather high probability.
Fact 3: Baptista cryptosystem is more of a stream cipher than a block cipher,
since same plain-characters may be encrypted as different ciphertext units. But
Jakimoski-Kocarev attack is designed following the idea of breaking block ci-
phers, which is not suitable for stream ciphers. Consider a general XOR-based
stream cipher with the secret key-stream {ki}, there exists a similar known-
plaintext attack to Jakimoski-Kocarev’s: once the first l plain-characters of
one plaintext are known by an attacker, he can XOR the plain-characters
and corresponding cipher-characters to derive the first l keys k1 ∼ kl, and
then the first l plain-characters of any plaintext encrypted with a same key-
stream can be decrypted successfully (but all following plain-characters still
remain secure). Generally speaking, such an attack cannot be considered as
a practical attack from strict cryptographic viewpoint, since it cannot break
the secret key generating the key-stream {ki} and cannot reveal the following
plain-characters by previous known ones [26]. Similarly, Jakimoski-Kocarev
attack is not a strong tool to break related chaotic cryptosystems, either.
Fact 4: it will be impossible to decrypt the ith plain-character in a plaintext,
if not all previous i − 1 units of the ciphertext are known. To calculate the
comment of interest of a ciphertext unit Ci, all i− 1 previous ciphertext units
C1 ∼ Ci−1 must be known: n = ∑ij=1Cj. As a natural result, it will be
absolutely impossible for an attacker to decrypt even one plain-character if he
does not observe and record all previous plain-characters. For example, given
a plaintext “Who am I”, if an attacker only observes the ciphertext units of
“ho am I”, he cannot get any association to decrypt other ciphertexts. This
fact lowers the practical applicability of Jakimoski-Kocarev attack.
From the above facts, we can see that Jakimoski-Kocarev attack is not so
effective as the authors argued in [25]. But how to understand the statement
“... over 90% of the moments of interest can be recovered using only 4000
plaintext/ciphertext pairs”? Assume the maximal length of plaintexts is lmax,
the maximal value of comments of interest will be (Nmax−N0+1) · lmax. From
Fact 1 and 2, the number of comments of interest Nc that can be obtained from
4000 known plaintexts will satisfy Nc < Np = 4000, which is much smaller
than 90% · (Nmax −N0 + 1) · lmax = 0.9 · (65532− 250 + 1) · lmax = 58754.7 ·
lmax. Apparently, the statement of “90%” is ambiguous and inadequate. In
fact, it is conceptually right that 90% of S values of plain-characters can
be obtained in the association table by 4000 plaintext/ciphertext pairs. But
such a fact cannot be used to show the effectiveness of the attack at all,
because different ciphertext units may correspond to the same plain-characters
in Baptista cryptosystem (recall Fact 3).
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4 A remedy to resist Jakimoski-Kocarev attack
Although Jakimoski-Kocarev attack is not very effective to break related
chaotic cryptosystems, it can still be useful in some situations. In this sec-
tion, we will present a simple remedy to provide satisfactory resistance to
Jakimoski-Kocarev attack. Such a remedy is available for all related cryp-
tosystems [12–14].
4.1 Description
Before explaining the remedy, let us see why Jakimoski-Kocarev attack works.
As we know, each ciphertext unit Ci is the iteration number for the chaotic
system (from x
(i−1)
0 ) to reach the -interval representing the current plain-
character mi, then C1 ∼ Ci can be accumulated together to recover the com-
ment of interest n =
∑i
j=1Cj. If the plain-character mi is known by an at-
tacker, he can directly get the association between the comment of interest n
and the plain-character mi, and use this association to decrypt any ciphertext
unit that corresponds to the same comment of interest n.
Apparently, if we cut off the way to construct the associations between the
comments of interest and the plain-characters, Jakimoski-Kocarev attack will
be disabled immediately. Here, we will employ chaotic masking algorithm to
realize such a task. Chaotic masking algorithm is somewhat like “whitening”
used in DESX, Khufu and Khafre cryptosystems [26, §15.6].
A natural idea to frustrate Jakimoski-Kocarev attack is to cut off the way
of an attacker to calculate the value of n =
∑i
j=1Cj. How can we do so?
A simple answer is to mask the ciphertext Ci with the current chaotic state
x
(i)
0 = F
C1+C2+···+Ci−1(x0). Since Ci is a 16-bit number (250 ≤ Ci ≤ 65532)
and generally x0(i) has more bits, some bit-extracting function should be used
to select 16 bits from the binary representation of x
(i)
0 to mask Ci. Please note
that the bit extracting function cannot be freely selected to avoid informa-
tion leaking of the current chaotic state, which will be discussed in the next
subsection. The masking operation can be either XOR or modular addition.
Assume the bit-extracting function is fbe(·) and the masking operation is ⊕, we
can use the remedy to enhance the original Baptista cryptosystem as follows.
Encryption. For each plain-character mi, iterate the chaotic system from
x
(i−1)
0 to find a suitable chaotic state x satisfying f
′
S(x) = mi (and other re-
quirements defined by N0, Nmax, η, κ), record the number of chaotic iterations
from x
(i−1)
0 as C˜i and x
(i)
0 = F
C˜i(x
(i−1)
0 ). Then the i
th cipher-message unit of
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mi is Ci = C˜i ⊕ fbe(x(i)0 ).
Decryption. For each ciphertext unit Ci, firstly iterate the chaotic system
for N0 times and set C˜i = N0, then do the following operations (if η 6= 0,
such operations can be made only when κ ≥ η): if C˜i ⊕ fbe(x) = Ci then use
x to derive the plain-character mi and goto the next ciphertext unit Ci+1;
otherwise iterate the chaotic system once and C˜i + +, repeat the procedure
until the above condition is satisfied (where x represents the current chaotic
state).
4.2 Discussion
Apparently, the above modified Baptista cryptosystem is essentially immune
to Jakimoski-Kocarev attack, since it is impossible for an attacker to calculate∑i
j=1Cj only by observing plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
However, we should carefully configure the modified Baptista cryptosystem to
avoid a new insecurity problem induced by the bit extracting function: be-
cause of the unbalanced distribution of the ciphertext in the original Baptista
cryptosystem, it may be possible for an attacker to guess some bits of the
current chaotic state with high probability. Assume fbe(x
(i)
0 ) extracts 16 bits
directly from the binary representation of x
(i)
0 = 0.b1b2 · · · bj · · ·, we can ex-
plain such insecurity about information leaking of x
(i)
0 . As we know, although
the ciphertext units Ci are 16-bit integers, the probability of Ci ≥ 212 is very
small (please see Fig. 3 of [12] and Fig. 1 of [13]). Hence, if we assume that
the four most significant bits are all zeros, such an assumption will be true
with high probability, i.e., 4-bit information of x
(i)
0 is leaked from fbe(x
(i)
0 ).
For i = 1, such information can be then used to exhaustively search FC1(x0)
with a complexity less than the complexity of exhaustive attack to x0. Once
FC1(x0) is obtained by the attacker, he can use it to decrypt any cipher-unit
that is not smaller than C1.
The above analysis shows that fbe(x
(i)
0 ) should not leak information of x
(i)
0 ,
that is to say, it should be cryptographically hard for an attacker to derive
any useful information about x
(i)
0 from fbe(x
(i)
0 ). In the following we will give
two classes of such bit extracting functions, as examples to demonstrate how
to make fbe(x
(i)
0 ) cryptographically strong. With the two classes of functions,
it is rather difficult for an attacker to derive x
(i)
0 from partial bits of fbe(x
(i)
0 ).
The first class is
fbe(x
(i)
0 ) = f
′
be
(⊕C1+···+Ci−1
j=0
F j(x0)
)
= f ′be
(
x0 ⊕ F (x0)⊕ · · · ⊕ x(i)0
)
, (2)
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where f ′be(x) can be any function that extracts 16 bits from the binary repre-
sentation of x. Using this class of bit extracting functions, an attacker can only
get some information about
⊕C1+···+Ci−1
j=0 F
j(x0). Consider Ci ≥ N0 = 250, it
is almost impossible for an attacker to get any useful information about x
(i)
0 .
The second class is
fbe(x
(i)
0 ) =
15∑
j=0
2j · b
(
F j(x
(i)
0 ),
⌊
F j+m(x
(i)
0 ) · 2n
⌋
mod 16
)
, (3)
where m ≥ 1, n ≥ 4 and b(x, j) = bx · 2jc mod 2. In this class of bit extracting
functions, all 16 bits are extracted from different chaotic states, and the posi-
tions of extracted bits are determined by chaotic states that are different from
the ones the bits are extracted from (m ≥ 1). Apparently, this class can be
easily extended to many variants, for example, we can change j +m to j −m
or change the definition of b(·). Also, we can combine the above two classes to
realize more complex bit extracting functions, which will further enhance the
security.
What’s more, by cancelling the unbalance of the ciphertext in the original
Baptista cryptosystem, another two methods can also be used to avoid the
information leaking of fbe(x
(i)
0 ) effectively. With the following methods, bit
extracting function can be freely selected.
• Method 1. Using the modified Baptista cryptosystem proposed by W.-K.
Wong et al. in [13]: the distribution of the ciphertext has been modified
to be nearly balanced, then the information leaking becomes practically
impossible (please refer to Fig. 2 of [13]).
• Method 2. Introducing compression mechanism: after C˜i is obtained, com-
press it with any lossless entropy compression algorithm (such as Huffman
compression algorithm [27]) to cancel the information redundancy (i.e., to
make the distribution of C˜i nearly balanced) and then mask the compressed
C˜i with fbe(x
(i)
0 ). Here, please note that the smaller C˜i is, the larger the oc-
currence probability will be, and the smaller the length of the compressed
Ci will be, i.e., the less bits will be needed to mask the compressed C˜i.
From the above discussions, we can see that our modified Baptista cryptosys-
tem is more secure than the original Baptista cryptosystem. To break our
modified cryptosystem, the initial condition x0 and the control parameter b
of the chaotic systems must be broken firstly to get x
(i)
0 , which just means
exhaustive attack of the secret key. Of course, there still exists one defect:
the encryption/decryption speed is relatively (but not much) slower than the
original one.
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5 Conclusion
In this letter, we re-study the performance and countermeasure of one crypt-
analysis presented by G. Jakimoski & L. Kocarev in [25], which can be used
to attack Baptista cryptosystem in [12] and another two chaotic cryptosys-
tems [13,14]. Our analysis points out that Jakimoski-Kocarev cryptanalysis is
not so efficient as the authors claimed in [25]. Also, we present a simple rem-
edy to essentially resist Jakimoski-Kocarev attack. Our work shows that more
delicate works should be done in the future to exactly measure the security of
the chaotic cryptosystems in [12–14].
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